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  Regulation of the cable television industry was marked by remarkable periods of 
deregulation, re-regulation, and re-deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s.  Using FCC 
firm-level survey data spanning 1993 to 2001, we model and econometrically estimate 
the effect of regulation and competition on cable rates.  Our calculations indicate that 
while regulation lowered rates for small system operators, it raised them for medium and 
large systems.  Meanwhile, competition consistently decreased rates from 5.6 to 8.8 
percent, with even larger declines during periods of regulation.  Our results suggest that 
competition is more effective than regulation in containing cable prices. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
For many years, policymakers presumed that cable service operators were natural 
monopolies because of the high initial costs of installing dedicated plant to receive and 
deliver video programs.  Prior to the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992 (the 1992 Cable Act), franchises were granted on an exclusive 
basis with the expectation that efficiencies resulted from one cable operator servicing a 
community, as opposed to two or more.  With most communities served by one provider, 
regulators sought to protect consumers from monopoly prices and poor service.  As the 
industry matured and new products and new ways of delivering video programming 
developed, the policy debate wavered between what form of regulation was appropriate 
to whether regulation was even necessary. 
In the mid-1960s, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) established 
rules for cable systems; first for those that received signals by microwave antennas and 
then for all systems.  In 1972, the Commission released new rules, including a 
requirement for cable operators to obtain a certificate of compliance prior to operating a 
system or adding a television broadcast signal.  Until 1984, the FCC regulated upper-tier 
cable services, and state and local governments regulated basic cable service.  Typically, 
local government oversight consisted of competitive bidding for franchise monopoly 
rights and rate proceedings to determine the appropriateness of future rate increases.  In 
compliance with regulatory guidelines, cable companies frequently supplied financial and 
operating data to their respective governing authorities.  Oftentimes, however, the process 
consumed valuable time and resources, particularly for small operators.  Arguing that the 
regulatory process was cumbersome and unnecessary, especially because of increased 
competition from other media sources, the cable industry petitioned Congress for relief.   2
In 1984, Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act (the Cable Act) 
that removed FCC regulation of upper-tier rates and prohibited local authorities from 
regulating basic rates if there was effective competition.  Congress loosely defined 
effective competition as circumstances where three or more unduplicated broadcasting 
signals (e.g. ABC, NBC, and CBS) were available within a service area.  The competition 
did not have to be a subscriber-based alternative.  As such, when the Cable Act became 
effective in November 1986, rate regulation no longer applied to most cable systems.  In 
these “competitive” markets, franchise agreements contained only non-price terms. 
Without viable competition in most markets and with cable prices rising more 
than two times the rate of inflation, Congress effectively re-regulated the industry by 
passing the 1992 Cable Act.
1  Congress directed the FCC to design regulations to ensure 
that basic cable rates were reasonable.  Accordingly, the Commission, in April 1993, 
adopted a benchmark approach to regulate prices in markets without effective 
competition.
2   The FCC’s established benchmarks took effect on September 1, 1993, 
causing overall average rates for regulated cable services to fall by as much as 10 percent.   
The size of the reduction was based on the average difference in rates of non-competitive 
cable systems and the standard set by those operators facing effective competition.  
Critics argued, however, that the inclusion of low penetration systems in computing 
                                                 
1 In the 1992 Cable Act, Congress concluded that without local competition, “the result is 
undue market power for the cable operator as compared to that of consumers and video 
programmers.” 
2 The benchmark group of “competitive” firms included systems serving fewer than 30 
percent of households in a local market (“low penetration”) and those facing head-to-
head competition, either from the municipality or another multichannel video 
programming distributor (MVPD).  The MVPD competitor had to offer an alternative 
service to at least 50 percent of the households in the franchise area and more than 15 
percent of those households had to take service from a company other than the largest 
one.     3
benchmark rates inflated allowed prices since many of these smaller systems actually 
charged higher rates and offered fewer services than firms facing “real” competition.
3  In 
response to this criticism, the Commission revised its methodology and separately 
considered the competitive differential for each of the three categories of systems: low 
penetration (1%), overbuilds (16%), and municipalities (37%).   Giving the most weight 
to the overbuild differential, the FCC (1994) ordered that, no later than July 14, 1994, 
rates in markets without effective competition be lowered by as much as an additional 7 
percent of rates in effect as of September 1992, adjusted for such factors as inflation, 
program modifications, and external costs.  
The FCC was optimistic that regulation would encourage pro-competitive 
behavior resulting in lower prices and better service.  Critics maintained that the FCC 
was ineffective in regulating the industry.  For instance, many systems were accused of 
putting newer, cheaper, less-watched channels on the basic tier and moving many of the 
more popular services onto unregulated, higher programming tiers.
4  Moreover, some of 
the larger multiple system operators (MSOs) signed social contracts with the FCC 
agreeing to customer rebates and commitments to capital improvement projects in 
exchange for less stringent regulatory oversight. 
                                                 
3 Low penetration could result from factors having nothing to do with competition, such 
as poor quality of service or service to only the most lucrative portion of a market. 
4 In March 1994, the FCC adopted its “going-forward” rules, which allowed cable 
companies to recover the full amount of programming expenses associated with added 
channels, plus a markup on new programming expenses of 7.5 percent.  In November 
1994, the FCC revised these rules, which allowed cable companies to increase rates by 
twenty cents for each channel added to the expanded basic tier plus license fees 
(maximum of $1.50 over two years).  The FCC also created the “New Product Tier” 
which firms were permitted to offer on an unregulated basis.  Crawford (2000) using data 
from pre- and post-re-regulation found no change in household welfare as a result of the 
1992 Cable Act.     4
Without strong evidence that regulation was effective in containing cable rates 
and with indications that cable rates were significantly lower in the limited number of 
markets where competition existed, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 (the 1996 Telecom Act), which reduced the regulatory barriers for cable operators 
and telephone companies to enter each other’s businesses.  Under this new law, all rate 
regulation ended on March 31, 1999, except for the basic tier of cable programming in 
markets without effective competition.
5  Congress assumed that, by that time, most 
operators would face sufficient competition from telephone companies and other 
multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) to make regulation unnecessary.   
Even with policy actions to promote competition, however, the industry remained 
highly concentrated, and most cable incumbents operated with no real or potential threat 
of competitive entry.  Anecdotal evidence demonstrated that MSOs purposely avoided 
direct competition, negotiating instead to swap systems with other MSOs to create and 
strengthen geographical clusters of systems.  Perspective overbuilders assessed the 
possibility of direct competition and overwhelmingly chose not to enter local markets.  
Some believed that incumbents could lower prices long enough to make their ventures 
unprofitable or opportunities for some short-run profits were not significant enough to 
overcome very high entry and exit costs.   
Others contended that, although cable agreements were required to be non-
exclusive, firms may have won and/or protected their franchises by agreeing to certain 
                                                 
5 With passage of the 1996 Telecom Act, small cable systems (less than 50,000 
subscribers in a franchise area and not affiliated with a large MSO), were immediately 
deregulated.  Moreover, the effective competition criteria were expanded to include video 
programming offered by local exchange carriers (LECs) in the franchise area.   5
transfers to the franchising authority, including non-price concessions.
6   It was suspected 
that in return for these concessions, franchisers put in place administrative hurdles and 
other barriers that made it too costly and time-consuming for third party firms to enter. 
While the lack of competition from overbuilds was disappointing to regulators, 
the primary objective of the 1996 Telecom Act was to facilitate another type of 
competitive entry.  It was hoped that local exchange carriers (LECs) would find it 
profitable to enter.  In the immediate years following the passage of the 1996 Telecom 
Act, however, the LECs moved very slowly into the video delivery business.  Uncertain 
whether consumer demand in markets served by well-entrenched incumbents would be 
sufficient enough to warrant the huge investment in broadband cable, the LECs hesitated 
entering on a large scale.   Instead, they began cautiously, packaging telecom and video 
delivery services through partnerships with direct broadcast satellite (DBS) providers.  
However, concern about losing customers to cable operators offering telephone service in 
their markets forced the LECs to enter on their own.  The pace of entry has quickened 
considerably in recent years.   
This remarkable period of deregulation, re-regulation, and re-deregulation offers a 
natural experiment to test the effect of regulation and competition.  Using a unique data 
set on cable rates from 1993 to 2001, we model and econometrically estimate the effect 
of regulation and competition on cable rates.  The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows.  Section 2 reviews the prior research on the effectiveness of regulation and 
competition in the cable industry.  Section 3 provides a description of the econometric 
model, while Section 4 discusses the data and variables.  Section 5 presents the 
                                                 
6 Zupan (1989) estimated that non-price concessions, such as community programming 
and institutional networks linking multiple public facilities, accounted for 26 percent of a 
cable company’s construction costs and 11 percent of its operating expenses.      6
estimation results.  Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the issues and policy 
implications. 
 
2.  EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATION AND COMPETITION 
Several studies evaluated the effectiveness of regulation and competition in the 
cable industry, and the extent and use of market power.  Otsuka (1997) examined price 
and level of quality for cable systems under different types of regulation in 1982 and 
found significantly lower basic prices and higher levels of service (number of distance 
channels and cable networks) in regulated markets relative to unconstrained monopolistic 
ones.  He concluded that regulation was welfare-enhancing.  Mayo and Otsuka (1991) 
showed that, while basic prices were above marginal cost in 1982, regulation held them 
to considerably below monopoly levels.   
By contrast, Hazlett (1995, 1997) suggested that the welfare effect of regulation 
was ambiguous, because, while prices were lower, so were program and service quality.
7  
Rubinovitz (1993) attempted to decipher whether price increases between 1984 and 1990 
were caused by an increase in the exercise of market power made possible by the 
elimination of price regulation in 1984, or a change in the elasticity of demand faced by 
cable companies.  Since he did not observe a change in the elasticity of demand, he 
attributed 43 percent of the real price increase since deregulation to cable systems being 
able to use their market power more after deregulation.
8   
                                                 
7 From a study of the welfare tradeoff to consumers of the provision of one additional 
satellite channel, Beard et al. (2001) concluded that the gain in consumer surplus due to 
an increase in quality was almost completely offset by the impact of higher prices. 
8 The remaining 57 percent was attributed to changes in cost and quality.   7
Jaffe and Kanter (1990), on the other hand, found that in larger, more competitive 
markets deregulation had a very small impact on expected profits.
9   They concluded that, 
since the majority of American households were located in larger markets with access to 
competitive alternatives that constrained market power, and since re-regulation could be 
market distorting and costly, free entry was the best policy approach for the cable 
industry.  Owen and Greenhalgh (1986) acknowledged that consumers might be better off 
with competition.  They believed that their finding of a 14 percent unit cost penalty in 
markets with overlapping firms, each with a 50 percent market share, was in the range of 
price markups that might be expected in the absence of competition or effective 
regulation. 
10  
Levin and Meisel (1991, 1993) also argued against re-regulation of the cable 
industry, favoring instead policies to promote competition among cable systems and 
telephone company (telco) ownership of cable services.  In their 1991 study, Levin and 
Meisel found that overbuild competition reduced basic cable prices by 22 percent to 30 
percent.
11  Similarly, Emmons and Prager (1997) recommended government policies to 
promote competition because they found that, without a loss in quality, basic cable prices 
were approximately 20 percent lower in overbuilt markets than those in comparable, 
                                                 
9 Jaffe and Kanter examined the sales value of cable systems before and after 
deregulation (from 1982 to 1987).  They found that in markets with relatively few 
product substitutes, expected profits increased after deregulation.  They recognized that 
the higher profits in smaller markets may have come from lower costs or greater pricing 
efficiencies, in which case it was better to let the monopolist keep them, than to eliminate 
the efficiency. 
10 Owen and Greenhalgh used response data submitted in franchise bidding proposals 
from 1979 to 1982.  
11 In their 1993 study, Levin and Meisel found that telco-owned cable companies charged 
less for basic service than non-telco owned cable companies.  They attributed the almost 
9 percent differential to lower costs and economies of scope rather than to anti-
competitive behavior and cross-subsidization.     8
private monopoly franchise areas, both before (1983) and after deregulation (1989).
12  
Since the estimates of the effects of competition were essentially the same in both years, 
Emmons and Prager concluded that regulation prior to the passage of the 1984 Cable Act 
was not very effective in limiting basic cable rates.   
Beil et al. (1993) also showed that competition was welfare-enhancing and that 
re-regulation would have increased market power.  Specifically, they found that head-to-
head competition increased the demand for cable services, and significantly reduced basic 
and pay cable rates.  In his study of 1982 cable rates, Hazlett (1986) also demonstrated 
that the rates for basic and HBO were considerably lower in areas with duplicative 
franchise systems, as compared to monopoly jurisdictions.  Using a 1990 sample, Merline 
(1990) found that the price of basic cable was 18.4 percent lower and the number of 
channels 21.2 higher for firms facing competition relative to those operating in monopoly 
markets.  Finally, Smiley (1990) conjectured that welfare effects of overbuilds depended 
on local supply and demand conditions.  Specifically, entry could be prevented if first-
movers cabled the entire franchise area and potential competitors did not have a way of 
differentiating their products from those already available in the market. 
 
3.  ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
The purpose of this study is to comprehensively evaluate the impact of regulation 
and competition on cable service rates spanning the years from 1993 to 2001, a period 
wherein the industry was deregulated, re-regulated, and re-deregulated.  If regulation was 
                                                 
12 Emmons and Prager’s findings suggested that neither the type of rate regulation in 
effect before the 1984 Cable Act nor indirect competition from alternative entertainment 
media provided an effective constraint on the market power of monopoly cable operators.  
While they recommended implementing government policies to encourage competition, 
they recognized that many markets were not well suited for overbuilds.   9
effective, prices would be constrained below monopoly levels during those years.  By 
contrast, during periods of deregulation, firms facing no competition would be 
unconstrained and could theoretically charge monopoly prices.  For firms operating in 
markets with viable competition from a second MVPD, pricing power would be 
weakened, and may or may not be additionally influenced by the presence of regulation.  
In our model, we attempt to isolate these effects and answer whether regulation and 
competition were effective in constraining cable rates. 
  Our methodology follows from standard profit maximization.  Firms produce 
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, or set price, P = MC / (1 + 1/*), where MC 
is marginal cost and * is the perceived price elasticity of demand.  Following Rubinovitz 
(1993), the regulatory environment could be represented by  
  P =  2 ( P - MR) + MC, 
where 2 is a measure of regulatory effectiveness. (e.g., 2 equals 0 under perfect 
competition, equals 1 under monopoly, and was calculated to be 0.3251 by Kelly and 
Ying, 2003 ). 
  With that underlying motivation for prices, we estimate a cable rate equation of 
the following general form, 
  R = R (m, e, r, c),  
where R is the cable rate, m is marginal cost, e is a vector of variables affecting price 
elasticity, r is a regulatory variable, and c is a competition variable.  Ideally, we would 
estimate a cost function and then compute marginal cost.  However, because of the lack 
of available cost data over the study period, we must proxy for marginal cost. 
The econometric specification of the functional form for the cable rate equation is 
somewhat arbitrary.  The most common form would probably be a log-linear equation,   10
which provides a first-order approximation to the unknown rate equation.  We have 
chosen a second-order approximation using a translog functional form.  It allows us to 
capture interaction effects such as the marginal effect of competition during periods of re-
regulation.  The translog rate equation can be written as  
ln R =  "0 + "m ln m + Σi "i ln ei  + "r r + "c c + ½ "mm (ln m)
2 +   
 ½  Σij "ij ln ei ln ej + Σi "mi ln m ln ei + "mr (ln m) q r + "mc (ln m) q c +  
  Σi "ir (ln ei) q r + Σi "ic (ln ei) q c +  "rc r q c + ,r , 
where ,r is a disturbance term.  To facilitate interpretation of the estimated coefficients as 
elasticities, all quantitative variables (excluding dummy variables) have been divided by 
their sample mean.  The equation is estimated using ordinary least squares. 
  Because the regulation and competition variables are discrete variables, their 
effect on cable rates is computed as the percent change in rates resulting from a unit 
change in the variable, r or c.  For example, in the case of regulation, we would calculate
 (R1 -  R0) / R0 q 100 = [exp ("r + "mr ln m + Σi "ir ln ei +  "rc c) - 1] q 100, 
where R1 and R0 are cable rates when r = 1 and r = 0, respectively.   
 
4.  DATA AND VARIABLES 
  The FCC agreed to provide us with survey responses from its Report on Cable 
Industry Prices for the years 1993 through 2001.  Company names and locations were 
deleted from the files for proprietary concerns.  Although the FCC conducted the survey 
annually, the same firms were not necessarily sampled each year.  The data set for this 
study is a compilation of variables from each survey consolidated into one file.  These 
variables include an average customer rate, total channels, number of basic subscribers, 
MSO affiliation and size, rates for basic and upper tier programming, and dummy   11
variables for regulatory status and whether a firm met the FCC’s effective competition 
criteria.
13  
Several data checks have been made to ensure that responses were valid and 
complete.  For instance, customers taking upper tier programming must subscribe to the 
basic service.  Therefore, the number of subscribers reported for the upper tiers should 
not be greater than the number of basic subscribers.  The average rate provided by each 
firm should be consistent with the FCC’s definition of what the average customer paid 
per month.  The disaggregated data on rates, channels and subscribers for equipment and 
programming services should validate the firm’s average rate response.  Finally, 
according to statute, local governments did not have the authority to regulate cable rates 
in franchises found to have effective competition.  Therefore, a firm’s response should 
not indicate that it is both facing effective competition and complying with rate 
regulation.  Because company names and addresses were expunged from the files, the 
ability to check responses has been limited to the information provided in the surveys.  
Firms with incomplete or inconsistent responses have been removed from the study.  In 
the nine-year study, there are 5,725 observations.   
With respect to the specific variables in the estimated rate equation, the dependent 
variable is the average customer rate (R).  It is given by the monthly price for basic 
service and the most popular cable programming services tier (CPST), as well as the most 
popular converter and remote.
14  We expect that this rate would vary depending on the 
                                                 
13 The average customer rate was not included in the first survey (1993, 1994, 1995).  For 
the purpose of this study, we have calculated the average rate for the firms in the first 
survey using the methodology specified by the FCC in subsequent reports. 
14 At a minimum, the basic service tier includes all local television signals, public, 
educational, and governmental access channels.  The optional CPSTs are available for 
additional monthly fees.  Excluded from programming services are premium, a la carte,   12
extent of regulatory constraints, the competitiveness of the market, demand conditions, 
and marginal cost.  A summary of variable definitions is presented in Table 1. 
The model also includes several demand and cost factors believed to have an 
impact on cable rates.  Despite the obvious importance of marginal cost in the 
specification of any price equation, we are limited by the available data.
15  We are further 
hampered by the inability to identify specific firms in the sample, which means that firm-
specific proxies for marginal costs are also infeasible.  Rather than incorporating a time 
trend to proxy for broad annual changes in costs, we use a measure of factor prices, the 
US average hourly earnings of production workers for cable distribution, WAGE.
16 
For demand factors, we include the number of channels received on the basic and 
major CPST, TCHAN.  It serves as a measure of system quality, as a higher number of 
channels should increase consumer demand and willingness to pay.
17  TCHAN is also 
expected to be positively related to price because of its impact on costs; offering 
additional channels would raise costs primarily because of higher programming 
                                                                                                                                                 
and pay-per-view services, and digital tiers.  The major CPST usually offers the most 
number of channels and had the highest number of subscribers among the CPSTs.  
According to the FCC, 90 percent of subscribers take both basic service and the major 
CPST. 
15 In an estimated translog cost function with actual 1994 factor prices for wages, 
programming, and capital, Kelly and Ying (2003) found that the factor prices for capital, 
labor, and programming were highly significant and yielded an R
2 of .99.  Using the same 
data in an ordinary least squares regression of marginal cost with just the first-order terms 
yields an R
2 of .90.  Meanwhile, an OLS regression including only those variables for 
which data are available from the price surveys (basic subscribers, total channels, and 
subscribers/homes passed) yields an R
2 of .11.  These results indicate the importance of 
the factor prices as determinants of marginal cost, but not necessarily of prices.  
16 The annual Producer Price Index for broadcast equipment and the median family 
income in the US were also considered for the model.  Because of multicollinearity, their 
inclusion results in implausible coefficients for certain variables. 
17 When a system is upgraded, it is expected that the quality and reliability of the system 
improve, including the ability to receive more channels.  The GAO (2000), FCC, and 
others found that more channels led to higher cable rates.   13
expenses.
18  Cable operators would expectantly pass some of those higher costs on to 
subscribers, depending on the extent of competition in the market and demand conditions.   
Another right-hand-side variable is the number of basic subscribers, BSUB.  It 
should capture some of the effects of demand elasticity, in that prices would be lower in 
larger markets where there are more video delivery substitutes.
19  Alternatively, BSUB 
might be a proxy for marginal cost since the number of subscribers affects such cost 
components as third party program reimbursements and the size of the distribution 
network.
20  If there are economies of scale, an increase in the number of subscribers per 
system might lower price.
  What creates some uncertainty about the impact BSUB might 
have on rates, however, is the fact that DBS, one of the most formidable competitive 
alternatives to cable, has penetration rates significantly higher in smaller, non-
metropolitan markets prior to the passage of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act 
(SHVIA).
21  Other forms of direct competition that might have been found in more 
                                                 
18 In addition to the number of channels, the most commonly used proxies for marginal 
cost include population density, number of subscribers, type of channels, MSO 
affiliation, age of system, homes passed, and local measures of per capita income and 
wage rates. 
19 Mayo and Otsuka (1991) found that in larger markets with more direct and indirect 
substitutes, demand for basic service was elastic.  By contrast, basic service demand was 
generally inelastic in rural areas. 
20 Chipty (1995) argued that large cable operators can enhance their bargaining power by 
threatening not to carry a supplier’s programming. Controlling for regional size, large 
operators, in terms of number of domestic customers, had lower marginal costs because 
of the increase in bargaining power. 
21 DBS did not generally transmit local broadcast signals until after 1999 with the passage 
of SHVIA.  Prior to SHVIA, satellite operators could only provide local broadcast signals 
to “unserved” areas where customers did not receive adequate over-the-air signals.  This 
was typically the situation in rural markets.  DBS operators only began actively 
deploying and marketing DBS in metropolitan markets after SHVIA.  The GAO (2000), 
using 1998 data, found that DBS penetration was not correlated with lower cable rates.  
However, in markets with higher DBS penetration, cable operators tended to compete on 
non-price terms, including offering more channels.    14
populated areas (overbuilds and multichannel multipoint distribution service, or MMDS) 
account for a very small percentage of the total market share.  
To more specifically test the significance of system size, the sample firms have 
been stratified into three categories: small (less than 10,000 subscribers), medium 
(greater than or equal to 10,000 subscribes but less than 50,000 subscribers), and large 
(greater than or equal to 50,000 subscribers).  Dummy variables for system size have 
been added to the model (SIZEM and SIZEL for medium and large systems, 
respectively).  The FCC began stratified sampling in 1996 because non-stratified samples 
placed disproportionate emphasis on smaller operators serving a relatively low 
percentage of subscribers.  By stratifying the sample, we are able to test if regulation and 
competition have differential effects on average cable rates based on market size. 
We also use a dummy variable to identify whether a system has a multiple system 
operator affiliation, MSO.  It is expected that there may be economies of joint ownership 
which could benefit consumers in the form of lower prices.  The number of subscribers in 
the MSO to which the firm belongs (MSOS) has been also included as a proxy for 
marginal cost.  We anticipate that prices charged by systems affiliated with larger MSOs 
might be lower because of the stronger bargaining position with programmers and/or 
scale efficiencies from consolidating marketing, customer support, billing, and other 
administrative functions.
22   
                                                 
22 Ford and Jackson (1997) found that increases in MSO size enabled cable operators to 
get quantity discounts and enhance bargaining power with suppliers – resulting in a 12 to 
13 percent decrease in programming costs/subscriber.  They suggested that if these cost 
savings were passed onto consumers in the form of lower cable prices, the effects of 
concentration could be welfare-enhancing.  Interestingly, the GAO (2003) and FCC 
(1994) found that cable rates were slightly higher when a firm was owned by one of the 
largest MSOs.   15
To capture the effect of the regulatory environment, we use a dummy variable, 
REG, to identify periods of re-regulation.   It equals 1 during 1994-98 and 0 for other 
years.  If regulation by the FCC was effective, rates would be lower during those years.   
In this study, competition, COMP, is present if a viable competitive alternative 
provider (overbuild, LEC, DBS, other) offered video delivery services in the market.  
Although the FCC included low penetration systems in its effective competition group, it 
has been criticized and we have redefined such systems as non-competitive.
23  This 
modification allows us to evaluate whether inclusion of low penetration systems affects 
the competitive rate differential.   
 
5.  ESTIMATION RESULTS      
The translog rate equation results are presented in Table 2.  We begin with an 
examination of the first-order terms to assess the overall plausibility of the estimated rate 
equation.  For the most part, these coefficients represent the rate elasticities for a small 
system operator (when SIZEM = SIZEL = 0), with variables evaluated at the sample 
mean or 0.  Following this assessment, we focus on the regulation and competition 
variables.   
                                                 
23 The GAO (2003) also found fault with the FCC’s process of updating and verifying the 
effective competition classification of firms in its Surveys.  Analyzing firms’ responses to 
the FCC’s 2002 Survey and using independent sources and interviews with company 
officials, the GAO (2003) determined that 56 percent of the firms classified as satisfying 
the low penetration test in the Survey had penetration rates exceeding the 30 percent 
threshold.  While the FCC calculated a 6.3 percent competitive rate differential for 2001, 
the GAO (2003), after checking the status of competition in each franchise and 
reclassifying firms accordingly, estimated that average rates in markets with a second 
wire-based competitor were 15 percent lower.  In an earlier study using 1998 data, the 
GAO (2000) found that, in markets where a non-satellite competitor operated in all or 
part of the franchise area, average rates were 10 percent lower than in those markets 
without such competition. 
   16
As expected, the first-order coefficient on the marginal cost proxy, WAGE, is 
positive and significant at the 1 percent level.  Its coefficient suggests that a 1 percent 
increase in wages leads to a .665 percent increase in the average cable rate of a small 
firm.  Several second-order WAGE terms are also highly significant. 
The first-order coefficient on the total number of channels, TCHAN, is positive 
and highly significant.  A 1 percent increase in the number of channels increases the 
average rate by .195 percent.  The higher price implies that there is greater demand and 
willingness to pay for better quality services.
24  It also indicates that the additional costs 
of having more channels have been passed on to customers in the form of higher prices.   
Of the system size stratification variables, only the first-order term for medium 
size (SIZEM) is significant at the 5 percent level.   Although the first-order coefficient for 
SIZEL is not significant, several of its interaction terms are reasonably significant.  These 
negative first-order coefficients hint that, compared to smaller systems, average cable 
rates are 6.7 percent and 7.4 percent lower in medium and large markets, respectively.   
There may be some economies of scale in the distribution and administration of video 
services.  It possibly indicates as well that demand conditions, including access to more 
and varied substitute products, limit the market power of cable companies in bigger 
markets.   
                                                 
24 More channels were equated to higher quality.  For many customers, however, as more 
channels are added they provide incrementally less satisfaction.  Cable tier pricing 
requires subscribers to buy all of the channels offered on the tier they choose to purchase, 
yet they may only watch a small number of them.  Some groups advocate “a la carte” 
pricing, wherein customers could choose and pay for the channels they wish to watch.  
While perhaps providing more subscriber choice, a-la-carte pricing may negatively 
impact network diversity and require additional technology and customer service (NCTA, 
2004).  It is uncertain what the impact on rates would be for the average cable subscriber.   17
The first-order coefficient on the MSO dummy variable is negative and 
significant at the 10 percent level, indicating that average cable rates are 5.6 percent 
lower for smaller systems with MSO affiliations.  It reveals that small operators affiliated 
with a MSO may benefit from the MSO’s bargaining position with third party 
programmers or the reduction of duplicative administrative functions.  Some of these 
costs savings are passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices.   
While the affiliation with a MSO is significant, the first-order coefficient on MSO 
size (MSOS) is not significant.  However, several of the MSOS second-order terms are 
highly significant, so it should remain in the specification.  For example, the negative 
second-order term on MSO*MSOS is significant at the 1 percent level and implies that 
given a firm is affiliated with a MSO, an increase in the number of subscribers in that 
MSO marginally decreases rates. 
Though the first-order coefficient on the number of basic subscribers, BSUB, is 
not significant, many of its second-order interaction terms are significant.  In addition, the 
positive, significant coefficient on SIZEL*BSUB shows that for large operators, more 
basic subscribers leads to higher cable rates.  It supports the interpretation of basic 
subscribers serving as a proxy for marginal cost. 
Having considered the plausibility of the estimated rate equation, we next turn to 
the principal variables of interest.  The first-order coefficient on the regulatory variable, 
REG, is positive and significant at the 5 percent level.  By itself, it suggests that after 
controlling for other factors, re-regulation has raised the average cable rates of small 
operators by 5.8 percent.  Of course, that interpretation could be misleading depending on 
the sign and magnitude of the other REG terms.  Of its 8 interaction terms, 5 coefficients 
are significant at the 10 percent or higher level.     18
  For a more complete evaluation of the effect of regulation on average rates for 
small, medium and large systems, we calculate the percentage change in rates (R) due to 
regulation (REG): 
  [R(REG = 1) - R(REG = 0)] / R(REG = 0) q 100 =  
      [exp (REG + REG*COMP + REG*MSOS + REG*BSUB + REG*TCHAN + 
      REG*WAGE + REG*MSO + REG*SIZEM + REG*SIZEL) – 1] q 100,  
where the terms in the exponential refer to the coefficients associated with that term and 
have been evaluated at the mean or representative value of the variables for each system 
size.  The results of these calculations are given below: 
   Regulation  without   Regulation  with 
   Competition    Competition  
Small  Systems   -0.38%     -2.55%   
Medium  Systems    5.28%       2.99%   
Large  Systems     2.54%       0.31%   
 
 
Average cable rates during periods of regulation are slightly lower in smaller 
markets, but actually higher in medium-sized markets by 5.3 percent and large markets 
by 2.5 percent.  Perhaps larger systems were able to take advantage of regulatory 
guidelines such as the “going-forward” rules and added channels to programming tiers.  
Systems could then raise prices to recoup the costs of these additional channels.  During 
periods of regulation, rates are lower in competitive markets than in non-competitive 
markets.  Controlling for factors such as product quality, these results raise doubts about 
the effectiveness of  re-regulation of the cable industry following the 1992 Cable Act. 
The first-order coefficient on the competition variable, COMP, is negative and 
significant at the 1 percent level.  It indicates that average rates are 11.7 percent lower for 
small systems facing competition.  Four of its second-order terms are significant as well,   19
at the 10 percent or higher level.  For instance, the interaction term with SIZEM is 
positive and highly significant, suggesting that competition reduces rates less for 
medium-sized companies. 
  To evaluate fully the effect of competition on average cable rates for small, 
medium and large systems, we calculate the percentage change in rates (R) due to 
competition (COMP): 
  [R(COMP = 1) - R(COMP = 0)] / R(COMP = 0) q 100 = 
      [exp (COMP + COMP*REG + COMP*MSOS + COMP*BSUB + 
      COMP*TCHAN + COMP*WAGE + COMP*MSO + COMP*SIZEM +  
      COMP*SIZEL) - 1] q 100 
Again, the variables are evaluated at the mean or representative value for each system 
size.  The results of the calculations are provided below: 
   Competition  without   Competition  with 
   Regulation    Regulation 
Small  Systems   -6.86%     -  8.89% 
Medium  Systems  -5.63%     -  7.69% 
Large  Systems   -8.79%     -10.77% 
 
  Overall, competition is effective in lowering average cable rates, from 5.6 to 8.8 
percent.  Moreover, excluding low penetration systems from the competitive group 
generally results in larger rate differentials than what were found by the FCC in its price 
surveys.
25  The most significant effect on rates occurs in large markets.  Despite the late 
entry of DBS and LECs into metropolitan markets, large cable operators may have 
                                                 
25 In its Report on Cable Industry Prices, the FCC reported that average rates were lower 
in markets where there was effective competition, ranging from as little as 2.3 percent in 
1995 to as high as 8.4 percent in 1993.  For most years, the average competitive 
differentials were approximately 5 to 6 percent. 
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responded to potential entry and indirect competition from alternative video services by 
constraining prices below the levels found in smaller markets.  We would expect that the 
rate differential would be even larger if data from more recent years were included in the 
study.  We also find that during periods of regulation, the competitive rate differential is 
even greater.  Perhaps there was a regulatory “spillover effect” wherein the possibility of 
expanded regulatory oversight disciplined cable operators.  In addition to lower rates, 
cable operators responded to competition by offering more channels. 
 Overall With  Competition 
Small   45.67   53.99 
Medium 47.67    61.54 
Large   59.81   64.98 
Average 47.85    55.91 
 
These results highlight the significance of competition in lowering rates and the 
ineffectiveness of re-regulation.     
   
6.  CONCLUSION      
   Certainly, our results suggest that competition provides the best solution to 
containing rising cable prices.  Administrative barriers and the cost of building and 
installing cable plant, however deter most overbuild threats, particularly by private 
operators.
26  Potential overbuilders realize that they cannot compete against incumbent 
operators solely by providing video programming in a small number of markets.  
Successful overbuilders need the resources to finance entry and the complimentary 
services to include in the product mix.  Fortunately, for a growing number of consumers 
living in communities without overbuilds, competition is not limited to this type.  Today, 
                                                 
26 Overbuilds exist in less than 2 percent of franchise areas.   21
two of the top four largest subscriber-based video delivery services are DBS operators.
27  
The entry of DBS forces cable incumbents to price and package their services to be more 
competitive, and spend millions of dollars to expand network capabilities.
28  In more 
recent years, cable operators are also being threatened by the well-financed LECs.     
As technological advances bring new products to market, the profit opportunity 
will be large enough in many markets to make it economically possible for two or more 
video delivery companies to compete.  Most likely, the entrants will be a DBS provider 
and/or LEC, as industry convergence and consolidation provide the means and the 
incentive to enter.  Policy actions should encourage competitive entry.  Re-regulation, 
although an option, has proven to be ineffective in constraining cable rates.  Competition, 
on the other hand, where it does exist, demonstrates that it can achieve the desired 
outcomes. 
 
                                                 
27 DIRECTV is second and EchoStar is third (NCTA, 2006).  DBS subscribers represent 
28 percent of the MVPD market. 
28 In areas where consumers receive local channels from both DBS operators, the GAO 
(2003) found that cable operators provided 5 percent more channels.  Furthermore, the 
GAO (2003) found that in 2001, two years after SHVIA, DBS penetration was negatively 
related to average cable rates.   22
Table 1.  Variable Descriptions 
    
Variable Description         
 
R    Monthly price for programming services (basic and most popular cable 
    programming service tier) and equipment (most popular converter and a 
  remote) 
 
REG    A binary variable that equals 1 if the year is 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, or  
1998 – periods of re-regulation. 
       
COMP   A binary variable that equals 1 if the cable system operates in a  
competitive market (does not include low penetration systems) 
 
MSO    A binary variable that equals 1 if the system is affiliated with an MSO 
 
MSOS   Number of subscribers for the MSO to which the     
    cable company is affiliated 
    
BSUB   Number of basic subscribers for the cable company     
 
SIZEM  Number of subscribers served by the cable operator is greater than or 
equal to 10,000 but less than 50,000 
 
SIZEL  Number of subscribers served by the cable operator is greater than or 
equal to 50,000 
 
TCHAN  Number of channels on the basic and most popular cable programming tier 
 
WAGE  The annual US average hourly earnings of production workers for   
    cable and other program distribution from 1993 to 2001   23
Table 2.  Translog Rate Equation Results 
 
Dependent Variable 
R:  Average Cable Rate 
         
Parameter   Estimate St. Error    
Constant     .047   .033 
REG      .056   .026   ** 
MSO    -.058   .032   * 
COMP    -.124   .026   *** 
SIZEM  -.069   .033   ** 
SIZEL    -.077   .049    
MSOS      .008   .008 
BSUB      .005   .010 
TCHAN     .195   .038   *** 
WAGE    .665   .137   *** 
.5*MSOS^2     .000   .001 
.5*BSUB^2     .000   .001 
.5*TCHAN^2   -.183   .030   *** 
.5*WAGE^2     .617   .530 
COMP*MSOS   .001   .003 
COMP*BSUB   -.015   .003   *** 
COMP*TCHAN -.012    .019 
COMP*WAGE -.061    .067 
COMP*MSO     .020   .024 
COMP*REG   -.022   .013   * 
REG*MSOS     .001   .003 
REG*BSUB     .006   .003   * 
REG*TCHAN   -.017   .017 
REG*WAGE     .496   .054   *** 
REG*MSO   -.043   .024   * 
SIZEM*MSOS    .010   .005   * 
SIZEM*TCHAN  -.056   .024   ** 
SIZEM*WAGE   .000    .080 
SIZEM*REG     .031   .016   ** 
SIZEM*MSO     .082   .032   *** 
SIZEM*COMP    .051   .015   *** 
SIZEM*BSUB -.014   .010 
SIZEL*MSOS   -.008   .010 
SIZEL*TCHAN -.058    .039 
SIZEL*WAGE -.011    .123 
SIZEL*REG   -.025   .021    
SIZEL*MSO     .068   .044    
SIZEL*COMP   .044   .025   * 
SIZEL*BSUB     .028   .014   ** 
MSO*MSOS   -.018   .007   *** 
MSO*BSUB   -.008   .009   24
MSO*TCHAN -.010   .033 
MSO*WAGE     .488   .126   *** 
MSOS*BSUB   -.003   .001   *** 
MSOS*TCHAN   .019      .005    *** 
MSOS*WAGE -.014    .014 
BSUB*TCHAN   .017     .006    *** 
BSUB*WAGE   .011   .016 
TCHAN*WAGE    .559   .089   *** 
 
R
2 = .659 
 
*** Significant at 1% 
**   Significant at 5% 
*     Significant at 10%  25
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